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There has always been a close association between the empiri-
cal method of process tracing and a theoretical interest in causal
mechanisms. In their highly influential 2005 book on case-study
research, Alexander George and Andrew Bennett refer to pro-
cess tracing as “an operational procedure for attempting to
identify and verify the observable within-case implications of
causal mechanisms.”1 It would probably be fair to say that
most methodologists and practitioners of process tracing see
the approach largely in these terms: as the search for evidence
of the mechanisms that are operating within a case and that
generated or contributed to the outcome of interest.
At the same time, there has been substantial ambiguity
about what causal mechanisms in fact are. In a survey of social
scientific and philosophy of science literatures, James
Mahoney identified 24 definitions that differ from one another
in crucial respects, including in their positions on: whether
mechanisms are composed of intervening variables; whether
mechanisms are singular or generally recurring, lawlike rela-
tions; whether rational choice is intrinsic to social mechanisms;
the level of analysis to which mechanisms apply; whether
mechanisms are mere analytical constructs or processes actu-
ally existing in space and time; and whether mechanisms are
themselves causes or, rather, connect causes to outcomes.2 It
is arguably much harder to be clear about how process tracing
itself should be conducted if there is confusion about the na-
ture of one of its key objects of analysis.
In this QMMR symposium, four leading qualitative meth-
odologists—Derek Beach, Rosa Runhardt, David Waldner, and
Andrew Bennett—advance arguments in response to two ques-
tions:
1. How should we conceptualize causal mechanisms for
the purposes of empirical social inquiry?
2. How, given this conceptualization, should we under-
take process tracing as an approach to causal infer-
ence?
In the remainder of this essay, I provide a brief roadmap to the
debate that unfolds and point to a set of important questions
that the discussion raises. I begin by juxtaposing the argu-
ments advanced by Beach, Runhardt, and Waldner, turning
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then to Bennett’s contribution, which critically reflects on two
of the other contributions.3
To the first question, the authors advance substantially
different, if partly overlapping, understandings of causal mecha-
nisms. Beach defines mechanisms as theoretical systems that
characterize entities engaging in activities.4 The key theoreti-
cal work in characterizing a mechanism, in Beach’s view, lies in
establishing productive continuity5 across steps: that is, in
stating as precisely as possible how each activity transmits
causal force from one entity to another. A key advantage of
this understanding of mechanisms, Beach contends, is that it
focuses our attention on how causal effects were generated
and outcomes emerged. Beach sharply contrasts this concept-
ualization with views of mechanisms as either intervening vari-
ables or linked counterfactual causal relations, pointing both
to explanatory gaps in and empirical problems with these alter-
natives.
Waldner, in his contribution, similarly understands mecha-
nisms as generative of outcomes and highlights productive
continuity as a desirable feature of causal explanations.6
Waldner also rejects a rather common view of mechanisms as
intervening variables but departs sharply from Beach’s under-
standing of mechanisms as systems of entities and activities.
In Waldner’s view, mechanisms should be understood strictly
as those components of our causal explanations that display a
particular property: invariance. While variables constitute
those parts of a causal chain that can be “wiggled,” Waldner
holds mechanisms to be those relations or features of phe-
nomena that do not change (and at least under a certain range
of changes in context). In an explanation of the forward move-
ment of an automobile, oxygen and fuel in the car’s engine are
variables that can be manipulated; combustion, on the other
hand, is an invariant process that always occurs under the
right conditions and thus constitutes a mechanism. Waldner
sees this conception of mechanisms as more fundamental than,
but compatible with, a view of mechanisms as counterfactual
cuases: if mechanisms produce effects, then they are also
causes in a counterfactual sense.
Like Beach and Waldner, Runhardt also draws on the con-
cept of productive continuity: mechanistic explanation, she
argues, requires a gapless account of how initial conditions
lead to outcomes.7 Unlike Waldner, however, Runhardt under-
stands mechanisms as chains of causation of the form,
A    B    C. More substantively, Runhardt parts ways with
Waldner in arguing that relations of invariance, which may be
common in the natural world, will be a much less prominent
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feature of social mechanisms. As compared to biological causal
processes, for instance, causes in the social world are far harder
to conceptualize in ways that lend themselves to lawlike state-
ments about effects; moreover, many chains of social interac-
tion occur only once. At the same time, unlike Beach, Runhardt
sees productive continuity as fully consistent with a counter-
factual view of mechanisms—a view with direct implications
for her methodological advice.
These three authors’ differing understandings of mecha-
nisms, in turn, inform their divergent arguments about how
process tracing should proceed. Beach, viewing mechanisms
as linked chains of entities and activities, contends that pro-
cess tracing should involve the search for evidence about
whether entities in fact engaged in the activities posited in a
given theory of mechanism. Runhardt, in contrast, holds that
observations of entities engaging in actions consistent with a
theory are insufficient to establish a causal connection be-
tween steps in a process. Rather, drawing on James Woodward’s
interventionist account of causation,8 she argues that ana-
lysts should seek more direct evidence of causal effects in the
form of empirical support for counterfactual claims (a strategy
that Beach explicitly argues against). Given the scarcity of
regularities in the social world, Runhardt argues, suitable cross-
case comparisons for establishing counterfactuals will usually
be unavailable. Instead, she contends, analysts should focus
their efforts on examining “theoretical interventions” by col-
lecting within-case evidence that is diagnostic of what would
have happened had the cause been manipulated.
Waldner advocates an explanatory strategy grounded in
his understanding of mechanisms as invariant relations.9 In
particular, he calls on process tracers to empirically construct
case-level event histories and to map those histories onto causal
graphs crafted from knowledge of invariant mechanistic prop-
erties of the world. There is, thus, a similarity between the
kinds of data implicated in Waldner- and Beach-style process
tracing: both involve a search for evidence of how things un-
folded within a case (rather than, as in Runhardt’s approach,
evidence of what would have happened under counterfactual
conditions). Yet these two versions of process tracing put
evidence of how things happened to very different uses. In
Beach’s approach, evidence of entities and activities is used
to test causal theories as explanations of an outcome. In the
“scientific solution” that Waldner outlines in his essay, in con-
trast, we use prior theoretical knowledge of invariant relations
as a foundation for drawing case-level causal inferences from
the data. Rather than testing general theories, process tracing
in this approach rests on general claims about the world.
In the symposium’s final contribution, Bennett takes a
step back to assess the state of the debate over mechanisms
and process tracing.10 He reflects, first, on how his own think-
ing about the meaning of causal mechanisms has evolved since
his early methodological work with George. While George and
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Bennett originally drew on Wesley Salmon’s work11 in charac-
terizing mechanisms as processes through which energy, in-
formation, or matter are transferred between entities, Bennett
has since moved toward a Woodwardian understanding of
causation as defined by invariant counterfactual relations, a
view that he sees as aligned with Waldner’s.
Bennett then turns to an assessment of arguments that
Waldner (in this symposium and elsewhere12) and Runhardt
have advanced about the logic of process tracing. His engage-
ment with Waldner focuses on the “completeness” standard
that Waldner has elaborated for judging the adequacy of the
causal theories and empirical accounts employed in process
tracing. While Bennett concurs on the value of completeness,
he calls into question Waldner’s claim that the standard pro-
vides qualitative researchers with “a much-needed stopping
rule” in regard to when sufficient evidence has been collected.
In particular, Bennett argues that the standard offers limited
guidance insofar as it will rarely be possible to establish com-
prehensive accounts of invariant social mechanisms. For in-
stance, for many social mechanisms the full set of scope con-
ditions and background assumptions may be impossible to
specify, leaving it unclear when an explanation invoking such
mechanisms is “complete.” (Waldner responds to Bennett’s
critiques toward the end of his own essay.)
Turning to Runhardt’s contribution, Bennett accepts the
importance of counterfactual-oriented evidence for evaluating
case-level explanations. Yet he sees far wider use of counter-
factuals in current process tracing practice than Runhardt ac-
knowledges. Bennett judges the counterfactual evidence in
Runhardt’s key illustration—Kristen Bakke’s study of Chechen
insurgency tactics13—to be substantially stronger than Run-
hardt does. He also points to important uses of counterfactual
reasoning beyond the establishment of causal effects; counter-
factuals can also be used, for instance, to uncover biases in
researchers’ mechanistic reasoning and to test scholars’ de-
grees of subjective confidence in causal claims.
The essays in this symposium do not resolve the ques-
tions of how we ought to define mechanisms or how we should
identify their operation within cases. The contributions help
advance our understanding of qualitative causal inquiry, how-
ever, by (i) crystallizing a set of distinct conceptualizations of
causal mechanisms and (ii) deriving from each conceptualization
an empirical approach to within-case causal inference. While
researchers may continue to understand mechanisms in differ-
ing ways, the essays in this collection can help us think more
clearly about how to choose a research design conditional on
our understanding of causality.
The authors’ arguments, moreover, raise a number of im-
portant questions about qualitative causal inference that are
in need of further examination. To suggest a few: To the extent
that counterfactuals are central to process tracing, what counts
as valid evidence to support a counterfactual? How far can
within-case evidence, as compared to cross-case evidence,
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take us in establishing counterfactual claims? If process trac-
ing hinges on knowledge of invariant mechanistic processes,
from where can we draw these prior beliefs? Can the tracing of
entities and activities in individual cases serve cumulatively to
build this kind of background knowledge? Or does Waldner’s
theory-driven approach imply that process tracing’s inferences
must ultimately rest on findings derived from other methods,
such as randomized experiments? Must we choose between
using mechanistic theories (a la Waldner) and testing theories
(a la Beach)? Or can we do both at the same time, starting out
with partial or uncertain knowledge of mechanisms and using
process tracing to refine and update these beliefs? Further, the
study of mechanisms can be put to different purposes. We
might be interested in uncovering mechanisms as a means to
identifying unknown causal effects, for instance, or as an ex-
planation of how known causal effects occur. How might our
inferential goals have implications for the methods through
which mechanisms should be examined?
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What Are We Actually Tracing? Process
Tracing and the Benefits of Conceptualiz-
ing Causal Mechanisms as Systems
Derek Beach
University of Aarhus, Denmark
1. Introduction
Most scholars now agree that process tracing, as a distinct
social science method, involves tracing causal mechanisms
using in-depth case studies. Studying causal mechanisms shifts
the analytical attention from causes and outcomes to the causal
process that links causes and outcomes together. However,
while they are widely used, statements about causal mecha-
nisms are also the least understood type of causal claim in the
social sciences.1 This short essay discusses two competing
approaches to studying causal mechanisms (a counterfactual-
based and systems understanding of mechanisms), arguing
that adopting a systems understanding of mechanisms results
in research designs that produce actual evidence of the pro-
cess we are attempting to trace instead of hypothetical ‘what
ifs’ or weak comparisons.2
Before we proceed, it is important to note that some schol-
ars use the term causal mechanism to refer to a series of events,
or a narrative story, prior to the occurrence of an outcome.3
Describing a series of events can provide a plausible descrip-
tive narrative about what happened, but it does not shed light
on the causal question of why things happened. Other schol-
ars like Abell do go a bit further than just tracing events. Abell
contends that when studying causal mechanisms, we need to
go beyond tracing events to develop narrative structures with
action linkages that build on subjective counterfactuals, where
we ask actors who participated in a process whether things
could have been different at critical junctures of a process.4
While Abell’s suggestion does point us in the direction of
moving beyond just tracing events, he then reduces the scope
of research questions that we can study to only those that can
be assessed by asking actors themselves whether things could
have been different. The two approaches to causal mecha-
nisms discussed in this paper go beyond tracing temporal se-
quences or subjective counterfactuals in their attempts to ex-
plain more explicitly why things happen.
2. Mechanisms as a series of ‘mini’-counterfactuals and
problems with the masking of causal logics
Within the social sciences, the most widespread understand-
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